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The Americanization of International Litigation
CESARE P.R. ROMANO*
"I'm so bored with the U... S ... A .... But what can I do?"'
I. INTRODUCTION
When the organizers of this symposium invited me to come to
Columbus, Ohio and speak about the Americanization of international
dispute resolution, my first instinct was to ask myself whether such a
phenomenon is actually taking place. I soon realized that I could not answer
the question without asking myself first what the term "Americanization"
means and whether there is a universal understanding of it. This is a problem
particularly acute in my case, being a European who works in the United
States, as, I am afraid, I have developed a peculiar form of "intellectual
strabismus," where I am simultaneously a censorious witness and a bemused
accessory of American global cultural ascendancy.
If what is meant by "Americanization" is the spreading, by sheer
appreciation, persuasion, awe, blackmail, or brute force, of U.S. styles,
concepts, ideas, practices, and preferences to the rest of the world,2 then it
should be obvious that, while Americanization of the rest of the world might
be a desirable goal of the citizens of this country, it is looked at with
suspicion, even hostility, by anyone who is not American. I say "should be
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Adjunct and Assistant Professor at Fordham University. He took a degree (laurea) in
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(Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale) in Milan; at the Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, where he obtained a D.E.S. (Dipl6mes des Atudes
Superieures) and a Ph.D. in International Law; and at the New York University School of
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I THE CLASH, I'm So Bored With the U.S.A., on CLASH (Epic Records 1977).
2 In the early 1900s, Americanization meant taking new immigrants and turning
them into Americans, by subtle, and not-so-subtle inducements, whether they wanted to
give up their traditional ways or not. See Charles R. Kesler, The Promise of American
Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (Noah
M.J. Pinkus ed., 1998).
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obvious" because Americans are often bewildered when they hear complaints
about the overwhelming influence of their culture.
Nowadays, Americanization is a very dangerous concept, and politically
supercharged, to the point of creating hysterical and sadly violent reactions.3
In this environment, globalization is often equated with the imposition of
American culture on the entire world and the dawn of the American Empire.
To the eyes of the great majority of the world-including many fellow
Western countries, which started dubbing the United States as the "Extreme
West" or more wittily the "Far West"-Americans seem to believe that their
institutions must confine all others to history's trash bin.
While there is some truth in this criticism, and surely the foreign policy
of the United States in the aftermath of September 11 does not help to
dissipate concerns, it misses a fundamental contradiction. American culture
is simultaneously both hegemonic and universalistic, being open to
influences as few other cultures of the world are. It absorbs, reprocesses, and
sends back to the original creator ideas and institutions that have become
ultimately American in the process, but that was certainly not so at the
beginning. Cultural influence is often a two-way process, and all the more so
in the case of the United States. Paradoxically, considering the way
American society is open and receptive, it would also be legitimate to ask
whether it is possible to speak of a "Europeanization," insofar as the United
States seems to be poised to replicate some of the mistakes of the past great
European Empires (regrettably so, I must add).
In regard to the legal arena, the transmission/reception story, if anything,
is extremely intricate and resistant to reduction.4 Duncan Kennedy aptly
illustrated the cross-Atlantic mutual fertilization of legal cultures and the
complexity of the phenomenon, which can be hardly reduced to matters of
nationality. 5 Besides, the question of whether there is a legal field which has
3 See BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: How GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM
ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD 3-4 (1995) (arguing that the clash of consumerist capitalism
and religious and tribal fundamentalism has led to one of today's most important world
conflicts).
4 The issue of the globalization of legal thought, including its Americanization, in
the period 1950-2000, was the object of a conference organized by the European Law
Research Center of the Harvard Law School in Spring 2002. Hopefully the results of
these discussions will be published in the near future. European Law Research Center,
The Americanization of Legal Thought (1950-2000), Academic Conference, at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/elrc/reports/2001-2002/activities.php (last visited
September 25, 2003).
5 See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE}
(1997) (discussing the complex development patterns of legal cultures).
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been primarily a producer and others that have been primarily receivers (i.e.,
private law -- public law --+ public international law), or whether there are
regional variations of the same problem, has not been adequately explored.
How is legal culture produced, received, or adopted? Does production
express a will to dominate and influence, or is it more oblivious to the
context of its influence? Is production conscious, following a mythical
master plan, or unconscious? Is it diffused because of malice, indolence (it is
easier to copy than to adapt), lack of capacity, naivet6, or an honest desire to
do good? These are questions that need to be answered before one can have
an educated debate over the influence of American legal culture.
Comparative law does provide many useful tools and insight into the ways
legal systems influence each other. The writings of the Italian legal scholar
Ugo Mattei on the increasing sway of the United States on legal culture are,
in this sense, illuminating. 6 Legal sociology can make important
contributions too.7
Granted, legal culture-or, to use a term which has become demodk after
the demise of socialist thinking, legal consciousness-is not a mystical
influence, but rather the result of concrete practices of multiple agents, not
exclusively lawyers, in a multitude of national and international systems. 8 It
is exactly on these agents that I would like to focus this Article, and how they
can become a possible, and in some cases actual, medium of Americanization
of international litigation. My approach is, in a way, sociological and follows
the lead of international relations literature that emphasizes the role of groups
of experts and practitioners in the diffusion of legal culture, practices and
6 See generally Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony
and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 383 (2003); Ugo Mattei, Three
Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP.
L. 5 (1997); Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed. Intellectual Leadership in Western
Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195 (1994).
7 In this sense, an excellent study by David Trubek, Yves Dezalay and Ruth
Buchanan, published in a special symposium issue of the Case Western Reserve Law
Review ("The Future of the Legal Profession"), is particularly worthy of notice. The
study is a cooperative transatlantic effort (U.S.-France) that analyzes in-depth the
transformation of legal markets by the dictates of globalization. It maps the role
international forces, which for most of the paper means "American" forces, play in legal
systems and professions, and what role law and lawyers play in the global economic and
political restructuring currently underway. The legal field is studied as a social field.
David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the
Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994).
8 Id. at 408.
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norms.9 This Article will thus tackle the question of the actual or potential
Americanization of international litigation through the lens of practices and
procedures of actual agents, that is to say, "legal culture."
My stated aim warrants two general considerations and four caveats.
First, one of the consequences of current American global preponderance is
that anything which is thought, said, or written in English tends to be labeled
as "American" while the English-speaking world is, of course, much larger
and diversified, and often it feels extremely uncomfortable being lumped
together with the Yankees. Much of what is generally held to bear an
American legal footprint, under closer scrutiny really bears the marks of
common law. Moreover, as it will be discussed below, it is extremely hard to
determine the true nationality of law firms that operate across boundaries, or
the national consciousness of cosmopolitan lawyers.10
Second, as it will be detailed below, observers and practitioners tend to
attribute to America's ill influence the growing tendency to jump at courts,
over-litigate, and procedurally tussle.11 While there is some truth to this,
albeit hard to conclusively prove, this kind of reasoning not only tends to
exaggerate certain censurable features of the American legal culture, but it
also deceivingly pictures the rest of the world as a merry circle of naive
tenderfeet, an epithet that can hardly characterize Europeans, or better,
continental Europeans.
Four caveats must also be made. First, my focus is on international
litigation and not international law at large, but one does not exclude the
other. International litigation is becoming a crucial engine of the
development and implementation of international law. While traditionally
these key functions were eminently the domain of States and diplomatic
negotiations, as the number of international judicial bodies has boomed and
their caseloads have become substantial, jumping to never-before-reached
levels, performing these tasks is increasingly shared with a new elite of
international judges and a sundry group of governmental and non-
governmental actors. Asking what role American legal culture plays in
international litigation implies asking also what role American legal culture
9 In particular, I refer to the notion of so-called "epistemic communities," a term that
indicates "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the
domain or issue-area." Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and
International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
10 See infra Part [V.A.
11 See infra Part 1.
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is playing in international law at large. Yet, this is beyond the scope of this
Article.
Second, this Article does not approach the issue from the point of view
of America's role as a country in the building of an international judiciary.
The issue has not been adequately studied. Too often commentators are too
blinded by the spectacular withdrawal of the U.S. acceptance of the
International Court of Justice's (ICJ) jurisdiction in the aftermath of the
Nicaragua case, or the snubbing of, if not overt hostility towards, the
International Criminal Court, to be able to fully appreciate how ambivalent
and shifty U.S. attitude has been on the question of the building of an
international judiciary. Yet, this topic in itself is important enough to warrant
a much larger study.
Third, this Article does not approach the question of the Americanization
of international litigation through the prism of the bench either. That is to
say, it will not try to discern American strains in international jurisprudence,
or, to put it in simpler words, contributions of U.S. judges to international
law and jurisprudence, yet another fascinating and oft neglected issue in dire
need of thorough discussion.
Finally, this Article will focus only on the major international judicial
fora with a global scope and where the presence of the United States, or
American nationals, is of consequence, such as the ICJ, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute settlement system. Regional judicial bodies, for instance the
European Court of Human Rights, which is outside the span of American
reach, will of course not be addressed. Additionally, this Article will not
consider international criminal tribunals, such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), where the presence of the United States is
much felt. Finally, Americanization of international commercial arbitration
has been treated elsewhere, and I will defer on this specific field. 12
A. On the Concept of Americanization in the Legal Arena: A Few
Quintessential American Aspects
The concept of Americanization is undoubtedly multifaceted, making it
difficult to pinpoint its contours. An approximate way of doing that might be
provided by the inductive approach, which means first empirically probing
12 Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The 'Americanization' of International
Arbitration?, 16-4 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 37 (2001).
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what themes are usually associated with the term "Americanization," and
then inducing some conclusions from the observation.
In the legal arena, there are several themes which are usually, rightly or
wrongly, associated with Americanization. The first and perhaps most
spectacular is what Robert Kagan describes as "adversarial legalism." 13 By
"adversarial legalism" he means a:
method of policymaking and dispute resolution with two salient
characteristics. The first is formal legal contestation-competing interests
and disputants readily invoke legal rights, duties, and procedural
requirements, backed by recourse to formal law enforcement, strong legal
penalties, litigation, and/or judicial review. The second is litigant
activism-a style of legal contestation in which the assertion of claims, the
search for controlling legal arguments, and the gathering and submission of
evidence are dominated not by judges or government officials but by
disputing parties or interests, acting primarily through lawyers. 14
It is a fact, proved by Kagan, that American methods of policy
implementation and dispute resolution are more adversarial and legalistic
when compared with the systems of other economically advanced countries.
Whatever is the source for the seeming love Americans have for lawyers and
courtrooms, the bottom line of Kagan's analysis is that, while adversarial
legalism has many virtues, its costs and unpredictability often alienate
citizens from the law and frustrate the quest for justice.
"Due process" seemingly is also another quintessential American legal
concept. I say "seemingly" because it is difficult to exactly define the
concept, since its meaning expands or shrinks according to jurisprudential
attitudes of fundamental fairness. At one extreme, "due process" is synonym
of fairness and justice, which, of course, is not an invention or monopoly of
the United States At the other end of the spectrum, it becomes coterminous
with legal formalism and excessive reliance on sclerosed procedures, a
perversion that can be dubbed "proceduralization." This latter aspect is, in
the eyes of many non-Americans, a real American feature, but I suspect this
is nothing but a manifestation of the adversarial legalism described by
Kagan.
Of course, the "American way of law" has also several virtues, which are
widely appreciated, admired, and oft imitated (although sometimes with
perverse effects). Probably the most laudable aspect is the stress that is





placed on access to justice. The idea that in order to be legitimate the legal
system must be seen as working on behalf of all segments of society is part
and parcel of American political and legal culture. In practice, this translates,
inter alia, into a drive towards greater access by all sorts of entities, be they
international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations
[hereinafter NGOs], or individuals, and in various capacities, to international
litigation, pro bono activities, and the so-called "public interest law firm."
These are surely archetypal American ideas, but to be fair, they are the
evolution of similar older institutions in the Anglo-Saxon legal culture.
B. Some Examples of Americanization of International Litigation
As to the specific field that I was assigned, that is to say litigation before
international courts and tribunals, I would like to present a few examples of
how these features of American legal culture translate in practical issues.
Before moving on to that, however, I need to stress that these are only a few
first-person impressions. There is still too little empirical analysis to warrant
determinative conclusions. Hopefully, soon this issue will be adequately
explored so that discussion can finally move on from unsubstantiated
exchanges of accusations of crypto-imperialism or visceral anti-Americanism
to a more informed debate. Moreover, it is important to note that
international courts and tribunals form a too large and diverse a class, with
infinite variations in procedures, styles, and quality of litigation, to be able to
draw any meaningful general conclusions. Thus, necessarily, one has to
proceed anecdotally.
II. ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM IN ACTION
A. Mega-Litigation
The tendency to over-litigate cases is a worrisome feature of adversarial
legalism. It is obviously a concern because it tends to tax the scarce resources
(human, financial, and time) of international courts and tribunals, and
because it makes litigation costs skyrocket. Moreover, to the extent that
litigation through international courts and tribunals is considered a means to
peacefully settle disputes, the end result of the process might perversely be a
deterioration of relations between the litigants even outside the framework of
the immediate object of the dispute.
Since the early 1990s, the idea that more-is-good seems to have taken
hold of the litigation strategy of several countries, and this fuels a perverse
vicious circle. This applies both to the number of lawyers pleading before the
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courts, and to the amount of evidence presented, as well as to the procedural
wrangling.
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary/Slovakia) case is an excellent
example. 15 In 1997, during the oral phase of the case, the judges of the ICJ
heard the arguments and replies of no less than twelve agents and counsels
for Hungary1 6 and eight for Slovakia. 17 The pleadings before the Court,
written and oral, reached the all-time record of twenty-six volumes. One
could wonder whether justice was better served by having such a plethora of
lawyers arguing before the Court, and even doubt the capacity of the judges
to read, let alone to digest, such a quantity of information. Incidentally, on
top of the wealth of data provided, since the parties estimated that the judges
of the Court could not get a detailed opinion on the facts at issue from the
15 Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 5). See
generally Peter H.F. Bekker, Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 273
(1998); Georg M. Berrisch, The Danube Dam Dispute Under International Law, 46 Aus.
J. PUB. INT'L L. 231 (1994); Cestmfr Cepelka, The Dispute over the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Systems of Locks is Drawing to a Close, 20 POL. Y.B. PUB. INT'L L. 63
(1993); Gabriel Eckstein, Application of International Water Law to Transboundary
Groundwater Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute over Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 67 (1995/96); JOHN FITZMAURICE,
DAMMING THE DANUBE: GABCiKOVO AND POST-COMMUNIST POLITICS IN EUROPE (1996);
Erik Hoenderkamp, The Danube: Damned or Dammed?: The Dispute between Hungary
and Slovakia Concerning the Gabckovo Nagymaros Project, 8 Leyden J. Int'l L. 287
(1995); Miroslav B. Liska, Development of the Slovak-Hungarian Section of the Danube,
in THE PEACEFUL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES 175 (Gerald H. Blake
et al. eds., 1995); Boldizsdr Nagy, The Danube Dispute: Conflicting Paradigms, 128
NEW HUNGARIAN Q. 56 (1992); Boldizdr Nagy, Divert or Preserve the Danube? Answers
'in Concrete'-a Hungarian Perspective on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Dispute, 5
REv. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENvTL. L. 138 (1996); E. Robert, L' affaire relative au
projet Gabctkovo-Nagymaros: Un nouveau conflit en matiere d'environment devant la
Cour internationale de Justice?, 47 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 17 (1996); CESARE P.R.
ROMANO, The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute (Hungary/Slovakia), in THE PEACEFUL
SETrLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH
246 (2000); Paul R. Williams, International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The
Dispute Between Slovakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of the Gabc'kovo and
Nagymaros Dams, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1994); Inventory of Conflict and
Environment Case Studies, Danube River Dispute, in Trade and Environmental Database,
available at http://www.american.eduTED/ice/DANUBE.HTM (last visited August 25,
2003).
16 Ambassador Sz6ndsi, Prof. Valki, Prof. Kiss, Prof. Vida, Prof. Carbiener, Prof.
Crawford; Prof. Nagy, Dr. Kern, Prof. Wheater; Ms. Gorove, Prof. P.-M. Dupuy, Prof.
Sands.
17 Ambassador Tomka, Dr. Mikulka, Mr. Wordsworth, Prof. McCaffrey, Prof.
Mucha, Prof. Pellet, Ms. Refsgaard, Sir Arthur Watts.
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overabundance of material submitted, as well as a videocassette shown
during the oral proceedings, a visit to the "scene of the crime" was organized.
Between April 1 through April 4, 1997, for the second time in the history of
the World Court, the bench left the courtroom in The Hague to visit a number
of locations along the Danube and take note of the technical explanations
given by the parties' representatives.
Actually, the only other time the judges of the ICJ had taken a field trip
was in a very similar case litigated in 1920 before the antecessor of the ICJ,
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ): 18 the Diversion of Water
from the Meuse case (Netherlands v. Belgium).19 The comparison with the
Meuse case, surely not a technically less intricate case, is appalling. In that
case, the Dutch delegation was composed of Professor Telders alone, and
that of Belgium by two lawyers and one engineer (M. De Ruelle as agent).
The pleadings of the case fill just one volume of a few hundred pages. 20
For the record, the result in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, a clash of
legal wisdom and lawyering skills of proportions worthy of Hollywood, was
a draw (as was the Diversion of Water from the Meuse case, incidentally), for
the Court found that none of the parties had complied with their obligations
under international law and that they should negotiate a new regime to
regulate the matter. 21 Since the parties have not been able to do so to date,
and it has been ten years since the original filing of the case, the case is still
formally pending before the Court.
More recently, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case,22 the teams of the
litigants appearing in Hamburg before the ITLOS, in the provisional
18 See generally Peter Tomka & Samuel S. Wordsworth, The First Site of the
International Court of Justice in Fulfillment of Its Judicial Function, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
133 (1998); Jean-Marc Thouvenin, La Descente de la Cour sur les Lieux Dans L'Affaire
Relative au Projet Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 48 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 333 (1997).
19 Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
70 (June 28).
20 Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 81
(June 28).
21 Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 1, at Operative
Paragraph B and C (Feb. 5).
22 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 1999 International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Case Nos. 3 & 4 (Aug. 27), 38 I.L.M. 1624 (1999);
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases-Arbitral Award (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 2000
Arbitral Tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Aug. 4),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/bluefintuna/main.htm (last visited Aug. 25,
2000). See generally R.R. Churchill, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and
the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan): Order for
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measures phase of the case, included counting Agents, Counsels, Advocates
and Advisers, no less than twenty-nine people in the case of Japan, while the
teams of Australia and New Zealand were within more reasonable
boundaries (respectively eleven and four). Interestingly, and we will revert to
this later on, the team of Japan included also American lawyers from the law
firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton. 23
Increasing adversarial legalism in the ICJ context also means trying to
exploit every provision and comma in the statute and rules of procedure to
wear down the adversary, a tactic which, however, often results in wearing
down the members of the Court, with unsought effects. To illustrate using the
Gabctkovo-Nagymaros case, from the date of the signature of the Special
Agreement between Hungary and Slovakia to refer the dispute to the Court
(April 7, 1993), 24 to the date in which the judgment was rendered (September
25, 1997),25 almost four and half years had passed, and this delay could not
be attributed to the Court. Actually, had the case not been brought by
agreement between the parties, one might wonder how long it would have
taken. In Article 3 of the Special Agreement, the parties decided that not only
a memorial and a counter-memorial were to be exchanged, but also replies.
Obviously both parties exploited to the full the time-limits allowed for the
filing of each: respectively ten months for the memorial, 26 seven months for
the counter-memorial 27 and six months for the reply. 28 A further delay was
caused at the beginning of 1997 by the request of Slovakia to produce some
the Provisional Measures of 27 August 1999, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 979 (2000);
Moritaka Hayashi, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: Prescription of Provisional
Measures by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 361
(2000); Barbara Kwiatkowska, Southern Bluefin Tuna, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 150 (2000);
Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v.
Japan) Cases, 15 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 1 (2000); Cesare Romano, The
Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute: Hints of a World to Come... Like It or Not, 32 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 313 (2001); Shabtai Rosenne, The International Tribunalfor the Law of
the Sea: Survey for 1999, 15 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 443, 464-74 (2000).
23 See infra Part II.B.
24 Hungary-Slovak Republic: Special Agreement for Submission to the International
Court of Justice Differences Between Them Concerning the Gabjikovo-Nagymaros
Project, 32 I.L.M. 1293 (1993) [hereinafter Special Agreement].
25 Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 1, at Operative
Paragraph B and C (Feb. 5).
26 Special Agreement, 32 I.L.M. at 1296.
27 Id. at art. 3.2.b.
28 This time with a time-limit set by the Court. Id. at art. 3.2.c. For the Court's order,
see Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1994 I.C.J. 151 (Dec. 20).
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new documents.29 Hungary was allowed sufficient time to comment on those
documents and Slovakia to comment on Hungarian observations.
This is nothing compared to the legal wrestling in which Bosnia,
Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia locked themselves in the early 1990s in the
Genocide case. In March 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina filed a case before
the ICJ against the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and
Montenegro) for the violation of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 30 The filing of the case was followed
(as it increasingly happens, but we will revert to this later on) by a request for
the indication of provisional measures. The Court, which did indicate
measures in April 1993, promptly acted upon the request. 31 In July 1993,
Bosnia and Herzegovina filed a second request for provisional measures,
and, once again, the Court passed an order to that effect.32 Two years after, in
June 1995, within the time limit for the filing of its Counter-Memorial,
Yugoslavia raised certain preliminary objections, to the Court's jurisdiction.
One year later, in July 1997, in the Counter-Memorial on the merits of the
case, Yugoslavia presented counter-claims against Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which were declared by the Court "admissible as such" in December 1997.33
Because of the new counter-claims, the court extended time-limits for the
filing of pleadings on the merits (in total between reply and rejoinder until
January 1999, later extended to February 1999, following a request from
Yugoslavia, and after the views of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been
ascertained). Yugoslavia's counterclaim was withdrawn in September 2001,
and this, of course, necessitated the parties to revise their memorial, counter-
29 Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 234 (Sept. 25).
30 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyframe.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2003); see also
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
31 Application of The Convention on The Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Order of Apr. 8, 1993, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyframe.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
32 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Order of Sept. 13, 1993, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyframe.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
33 Incidentally, this was the first time that the Court has ruled on the admissibility of
counter-claims at a preliminary stage. In the past the Court adjudicated twice on
counterclaims (Asylum (Colom.IPeru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20) and Rights of Nationals
of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27)), but
it did so simultaneously with its final decision on the merits of the case.
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memorials, and so on. At the time of this writing, Spring 2003, and ten years
after the beginning, the case has not yet been decided on the merits.
Another incident, in the same case, could also be mentioned. In the order
on the (second) request of provisional measures, a patently harassed Court
made the following statement:
By a series of communications, dated 6 August, 7 August, 8 August, 10
August, 13 August, 22 August, 23 August[,] and 24 August 1993[,] the
Agent of Bosnia-Herzegovina stated that he was further amending or
supplementing the second request for provisional measures, as well as, in
some cases, the Application instituting proceedings ... during the oral
proceedings the Agent of Bosnia-Herzegovina presented to the Court a
further written communication, dated 25 August 1993, directed to
supplementing and amending the second request for provisional measures
and the Application instituting proceedings.., at the hearing of 26 August
1993 counsel for Yugoslavia protested at "the unending flood of sometimes
heavy documentation" from the Agent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and asked
the Court to declare the communication of 25 August 1993 inadmissible;
and.., on 26 August 1993 the Agent of Bosnia-Herzegovina presented to
the Court a further written communication supplementing the second
request.., the submission by the Applicant of a series of documents, up to
the eve of, and even during, the oral proceedings, in the circumstances set
out.., above, is difficult to reconcile with an orderly progress of the
procedure before the Court, and with respect for the principle of equality of
the parties. 34
Still, the Court eventually found this behavior admissible "taking into
account the urgency and the other circumstances of the matter." 35 Granted,
the historical and political context in which this particular case took place
can explain much of such a baffling way to litigate (and in particular the
request for two orders, and the amendments on-the-fly, the counter-claim,
and its withdrawal in 2001), but similar instances of legal overkill seem to
become disturbingly frequent.
Again, and remaining on the ICJ, since the 1990s, exercise of incidental
jurisdiction by the Court, revision of judgments, intervention by third parties,
and requests to reopen cases, have passed from being exceptional-as
perhaps it should normally be-to being the rule. Of the forty-four cases filed
34 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), at paras. 14, 20, & 21, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/ icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyframe.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
35 Id. at para. 21.
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before the Court since 1990 (from the Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute case36
to Certain Criminal Proceedings in France case),37 in only seven cases the
Court was not requested to indicate provisional measures, no preliminary
objections were raised, no third party sought to intervene, no counter-claims
were filed, or the new case could be considered as a legal spin-off of a
previous case. 38 Besides, several of those cases are still pending, hence
something can still happen. Conversely, provisional measures were requested
in twenty-three cases (counting the ten cases filed by Yugoslavia against
NATO countries individually, but not including the double request of
measures in the above mentioned Genocide case).39 Preliminary objections
36 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
37 Case Concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France, (Congo v. Fr.) 2003
I.C.J. (forthcoming) (July 11).
38 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colum), 2002 I.C.J. (forthcoming)
(Feb. 26); Certain Property (Liech. v. F.R.G.), 2001 I.C.J. (forthcoming) (June 28);
Maritime Delimitation Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v.
Hond.), 2000 I.C.J. 21 (Mar. 21); Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), 1999 I.C.J. 235 (June
2); Kasikili/Dedudu Islans (Bots./Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13); East Timor (Port.
v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30); Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad),
1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
39 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Cong. v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14);
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), 2001 I.C.J. 13 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use
of Force (Yugoslavia v. Can.), 2001 I.C.J. 16 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. Fr.), 2001 I.C.J. 19 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
F.R.G.), 2001 I.C.J. 22 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Italy), 2001
I.C.J. 25 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Neth.), 2001 I.C.J. 28 (Feb.
21); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Port.), 2001 I.C.J. 31 (Feb. 21); Legality of
Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.), 2001 I.C.J. 34 (Feb. 21); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.),
2001 I.C.J. (forthcoming) (June 27); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Congo v. Burundi), 2001 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 30); Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Congo v. Rwanda), 2001 I.C.J. 6 (Jan. 30); Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), 2001 I.C.J. (forthcoming) (Nov. 29); Legality of Use of
Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), 1999 I.C.J. 761 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 916 (June 2); Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), 1999
I.C.J. 235 (June 2); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 115 (Feb. 27); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1998 I.C.J. 9 (Feb. 22); Land and Maritime Boundary Between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 275 (June 11); Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10); Gabcfkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 97 I.C.J. 234 (Sept. 5); Passage Through the Great
Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 I.C.J. 41 (Sept. 10); Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. (forthcoming) (Dec. 15); Case Concerning Armed
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were raised in nineteen cases (again counting the ten cases filed by
Yugoslavia against NATO countries individually).40 There were four
requests for revision or interpretation of previous judgments, or re-
examination of the situation4 l (against two such requests in the previous
thirty-five years of life of the Court42), plus, as it was said before, in the
Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Rwanda (new application)), 2002 I.C.J.
(forthcoming) (Sept. 18); Case Concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France
(Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. (forthcoming) (July 11).
40 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v.
Rwanda) (new application)), 2002 I.C.J. (forthcoming) (Sept. 18); Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J.
(forthcoming) (Mar. 16); Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Congo), 2000 I.C.J. 146
(Sept. 8); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), 2001 I.C.J. 13 (Feb. 21);
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Can.), 2001 I.C.J. 16 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use
of Force (Yugoslavia v. Fr.), 2001 I.C.J. 19 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. F.R.G.), 2001 I.C.J. 22 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
Italy), 2001 I.C.J. 25 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Neth.), 2001
I.C.J. 28 (Feb. 21); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Port.), 2001 I.C.J. 31 (Feb.
21); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.), 2001 I.C.J. 34 (Feb. 21); Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v.
Yugoslavia), 2000 I.C.J. 12 (June 27); Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India),
2000 I.C.J. 12 (June 21); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), 1999 I.C.J. 761
(June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 916 (June 2);
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1998 I.C.J. 9
(Feb. 27); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 115 (Feb. 27); Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 275 (June 11); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J.
803 (Dec. 12); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4);
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Yugoslavia), supra note 30.
41 Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 the
Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J.
288 (Sept. 22); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case
Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nig.), 1999 I.C.J. 31 (Mar. 25); Application for Revision of the Judgment
of 11 September 1992 in the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.: Nicar. Intervening), (I.C.J. filed Sept. 10, 2002); Application
for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the Case Concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Yugoslavia v.
Bosn. & Herz.) (I.C.J. request inadmissible).
42 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 20 November 1950 in Asylum Case,
(Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 395 (Nov. 27); Application for Revision and Interpretation
of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf
(Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1985 I.C.J. 192 (Dec. 10).
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Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, Hungary and Slovakia returned to the Court
once they concluded they could not come to the agreement they had been
told to negotiate. Finally, in one case, filed by agreement between the parties,
a third-party applied to intervene. 43
There is no doubt that enthusiastic use of the ICJ is something to be
wished for. However, when use turns to exploitation, as increasingly seems
to be the case, it can be a legitimate cause of concern. Whether this can be
attributed to bad American influences is difficult to prove, but it is a fact that
the Peace Palace increasingly resembles a family court in Manhattan for the
keenness of its litigants.
B. The Voir Dire Incident
Another anecdote, this time at the ITLOS, and concerning the above-
mentioned Southern Bluefin Tuna case, however, can be traced to a particular
American source. To summarize, as the title of the case indicates, the dispute
took place between Australia and New Zealand, on the one hand, and Japan,
on the other, over the status of that Southern Bluefin Tuna stock in the South
Pacific. While Japan insisted that more tuna could be fished without
endangering the stock, Australia and New Zealand insisted that could not be
done. To block an experimental fishing program by Japan, in the summer of
1999, the two countries filed a case before the ITLOS and demanded the
Tribunal to prescribe provisional measures.
What matters for the purpose of this paper is that, because of the
scientific uncertainty surrounding the case, Australia and New Zealand
introduced an expert witness (besides the reports of the applicants' own
scientists: Messrs. Polacheck, Preece, and Murray), Dr. John Beddington,
Professor of Applied Population Biology at the Imperial College, London, to
discuss the state of the stock. Much to the surprise of the legal team of
Australia and New Zealand, and the Tribunal itself, Japan asked to have the
expert subjected to a sort of voir dire procedure. 44 Specifically, Dr.
Beddington was to be questioned by the attorneys of Japan about his
qualification as an expert. In particular, the voir dire was carried out by Mr.
Matthew Slater, a lawyer of the firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton.
43 Sovereignty over Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), 2001 I.C.J.
(forthcoming) (Oct. 23).
44 "Voir Dire" is French for "to speak the truth." See "Voir Dire," BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1271 (abridged 7th ed. 2000) (defining voir dire as "[a] preliminary
examination of a prospective juror by a judge or a lawyer to decide whether the prospect
is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury" or "[a] preliminary examination to test the
competence of a witness or evidence").
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The stated purpose was verifying Dr. Beddington's "credibility and
capability.., to offer specialised expertise on matters relevant to the case." 45
In reality, much of the voir dire examination was a debate between Mr.
Slater, Prof. James Crawford, one of the counsels for Australia, and the
President of the Tribunal, under whose control the examination took place,
46
over what ground the voir dire could cover and what should have been left to
the successive cross-examination phase.
This voir dire incident is perplexing for a number of reasons. First,
examination on the voir dire of experts is extremely unusual in international
judicial fora. The only other known instance of preliminary examination of
an expert witness to determine competence and independence dates back to
the South West Africa cases, litigated in the 1960s before the ICJ. 47 Much as
in that case, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, too, the President of the court
was strict in limiting the examination to the witness's expertise, and not to
allow it to extend to the witness's views on the matter.48 Second, the parties
to a case before judicial bodies like the ICJ or ITLOS are sovereign states,
not private parties. Because of this patent difference, as countries can choose
to be represented by anyone of their choice,49 whether that person is an
attorney at law admitted to the practice or not, they can also seek the advice
and witness from qualified persons of their choice. It is then for the Tribunal
to hear what the witness has to say during the examination and cross-
examination and decide what weight should be given to the testimony.
Finally, from a practical point of view, it is difficult to understand what the
voir dire could add to the substance of the case that could not be ascertained
during the examination and cross-examination phase.
This kind of episode is typical of American litigation strategies, and voir
dire is largely unknown, at least under this specific label and as a specific
incident of procedure, around the world (including Japan). At least in this
45 Southern Bluefim Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 1999 International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 35 (Aug. 18).
46 International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea Rules, Rule 80, available at
http://www.itlos.org/documents-publications/documents/rulesen.doc (last visited Sept.
25, 2003).
47 See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings (X
South West Africa) 340; see also SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1920-1996) 1358 (3 rd ed. 1997) (reporting the incident).
48 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 1999 International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 1 (Aug. 18); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v.
S. Mr.), 1950 I.C.J. 135 (July 11).




specific instance of adversarial legalism, there were clear American
fingerprints all over the crime scene.
I. THE OPENING OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE TO
AMICI CURIAE AND PRIVATE LAWYERS
The "American way of law" is not only about over-litigation and crafty
lawyers; it is also about openness, participation, and access to justice. There
are two aspects of this general issue that I would like to address, namely that
of amici curiae and that of private lawyers' participation in interstate
litigation. I will focus on the World Trade Organization (WTO) because,
while formally the dispute settlement procedure of the WTO is open only to
States (besides the European Community) and litigation takes place States, in
reality, States are often only proxies for dueling private commercial
enterprises vying for shares of world markets. In this context, issues of
greater participation of non-state entities are understandably subjects of
intense debate.
A. The "Amicus Curiae" Debate5o
An amicus curiae ("friend of the court") can be described as a bystander
who, without a direct interest in the litigation, on his own initiative brings to
the attention of the court matters of fact or law within his knowledge which
are in doubt or that might otherwise escape the court's attention.5 1 The
amicus might step forward on his own initiative, or he might be requested by
the court to present legal arguments which are otherwise unaddressed or
unrepresented by the parties. Either way, the primary role of the amicus is to
assist the court. In other words, the amicus is a friend of the court, not of
either party, nor of the furry little mammals which, for instance, might be the
object of the dispute.
Yet, while this is the notion of amicus curiae by the book, over time a
more advocacy-oriented amicus function has evolved whereby an
organization or group makes submissions to the court either in support of one
50 On amicus curiae briefs before international judicial bodies, including the WTO
debate, see Christine Chinkin & Ruth MacKenzie, Intergovernmental Organizations as
"Friends of the Court," in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 135, 135-162 (Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes et al. eds., 2002).
51 See Ernest Angell, The Amicus Curiae: American Development of English
Institutions, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1017, 1017 (1967); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus
Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694, 694-95 (1963).
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of the parties to the dispute, or to further its own interest, or to ensure a wide
ventilation of views in what the amicus deems to be the public interest. This
wider interpretation of the amicus curiae role has taken hold in the U.S., up
to the point that it is formally provided for in the U.S. Supreme Court rules. 52
The idea of amicus curiae is, of course, not solely an American one.
First, it can be found in most common law legal systems. 53 Second, while it
is most widely used in common law jurisdictions, it is not unknown in civil
law systems (for instance, the Avocat Ggnjral can be considered as a form of
institutionalized friend of the court). But, in the United States, the idea of the
amicus as an advocacy-oriented institution has become predominant, and in
this specific connotation, it has recently become the subject of intense debate
in the WTO. 5 4
On the one hand, there are developing countries, which are concerned
about the constantly increasing judicialization of the WTO dispute settlement
procedures and the possible loss of control of the procedures by the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB), where they have the majority of seats. To them,
opening the doors of the WTO to civil society is tantamount to letting in a
motley collection of environmental and human rights NGOs, and even
industrial lobbying groups, all of them based in the North. Each of these has
its own agenda, which, despite claims to the contrary, rarely reflects the
interests of developing countries, and has human and financial resources in
many cases far superior to those that any given developing country could
field in litigation. On the other hand, there are developed countries-but in
reality mainly the United States-which advocate for less diplomacy and
greater legalism in WTO dispute settlement, and opening to civil society.
52 SuP. CT. R. 37.
53 There is a large body of literature addressing the advantages and disadvantages of
amicus intervention and its potential implications in common law jurisdictions. See
generally Bernard M. Dickens, A Canadian Development: Non-Party Intervention, 40
MOD. L. REV. 666 (1977); Susan Kenny, Note, Interveners and Amici Curiae in the High
Court, 20 ADEL. L. REV. 159 (1998); Allison Lucas, Friends of the Court? The Ethics of
Amicus Brief Writing in First Amendment Litigation, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1605
(1999); Rosemary Owens, Interveners and Amicus Curiae: The Role of the Courts in a
Modern Democracy, 20 ADEL. L. REV. 193 (1998); Loretta Re, The Amicus Curiae Brief:
Access to the Courts for Public Interest Associations, 14 MELB. U. L. REV. 522 (1984);
David Scriven & Paul Muldoon, Intervention as Friend of the Court: Rule 13 of the
Ontario Rule of Civil Procedure, 6 ADVOC. Q. 448 (1986).
54 See WTO, Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council Held on 22 November
2000, WT/GC/M/60 (Jan. 23, 2001); see also Chinkin, supra note 50, at 149-53;
Gabrielle Marceau & Matthew Stillwell, Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs
Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 155 (2001).
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As there are no provisions in the basic instrument of the WTO dispute
settlement machinery-the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)-
explicitly allowing panels or the Appellate Body to receive amicus curiae
briefs, eventually panels and the Appellate Body adopted an incremental
strategy, inching forward the goal of opening the doors to civil society, but
not without being met with fierce, and, so far, decisive resistance by
developing countries.
The issue first arose before a WTO dispute settlement panel in the
Shrimp-Turtle case.55 In short, the case was brought against the United States
by a number of developing countries which objected to U.S. restrictions on
the import of shrimp that could not be certified as fished in a turtle-friendly
manner (turtles get caught in large numbers in the nets used to catch shrimp
and drown). A number of environmental NGOs, several of which are U.S.
based, sought to have their views submitted. 56 At first, the panel found that
under the DSU, it had no authority to accept unsolicited amicus briefs. The
panel ruling was challenged by the United States. Before the Appellate Body,
the U.S. delegation pushed hard to have these briefs considered. Some were
even attached to the U.S. submission. Eventually, the Appellate Body found
that Articles 12 and 13 of the DSU do give a panel authority "to undertake
and to control the process by which it informs itself both of the relevant facts
of the dispute and of the legal norms and principles applicable to such
facts." 57 Indeed, it found that this authority was necessary to enable the panel
to discharge its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to "make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the
facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
covered agreements." 58 The Appellate Body confirmed that a panel could
seek information and technical advice from any individual or body, or from
any relevant source, and that there was no prohibition on accepting non-
requested information. 59
55 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Importation of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (May 15, 1998).
56 These include the World Wide Fund for Nature, the Earth Island Institute, the
Humane Society of the United States, and the Sierra Club, the Center for International
Environmental Law, the Center for Marine Conservation, the Environment Foundation
Limited, the Mangrove Action Project, the Philippine Ecological Network, Red Nacional
de Accion Ecologica, and Sobrevivencia.
57 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Importation of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 55, para. 106.
58 Id.
59 Id. at paras. 101-08.
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The second step in the amici debate is the Carbon Steel case,60 brought
against the United States by the European Community (EC). In this case,
unsolicited amicus briefs were submitted to the Appellate Body by two U.S.
industry lobbies (The American Iron and Steel Institute and The Specialty
Steel Industry of North America). The EC contested this, arguing that while
amicus briefs from NGOs could be received by panels in terms of Article 13
as set out by the Shrimp-Turtle case, Article 13 only enabled receiving
factual information and technical advice, and not legal arguments or
interpretations from non-members. Eventually, the Appellate Body noted that
while nothing in the DSU or Working Procedures provided for it to accept
and consider submissions from sources other than parties and third parties in
the appeal (i.e., WTO Members), there was also nothing in the governing
rules which explicitly prohibited the acceptance and consideration of such
briefs. 61 However, the Appellate Body emphasized that individuals and
organizations which are not members of the WTO have no legal right to
make submissions or to be heard.62 Be that as it may, in the end, the
Appellate Body stated that it had not found it necessary to take into account
the two amicus briefs it had received, 63 thus momentarily postponing the
wrath of developing countries, which, by now, were paying close attention to
these developments.
Although in the aftermath of the Carbon Steel case the DSB started
debating aloud the issues raised by opening the procedure to civil society,
albeit only via amici curiae, it still fell short of behesting the Appellate Body
to desist. It did not take long before another case arose that could give the
Appellate Body the chance to test how far it could go. A highly visible
dispute between France and Canada over a French ban on asbestos, a cancer
causing material, had been ruled in favor of France at the panel level. Yet the
panel had reached such a conclusion by way of a reasoning that raised the
concern of environmental NGOs, as they believed that it might send a signal
to regulators that distinctions between safe and poisonous products might
raise a WTO dispute, freezing their efforts to make laws to protect human
health and the environment.
60 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Imposition of Countervailing
Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in
the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000).
61 Id. at para. 39.
62 Id. at para. 41.
63 Id. at para. 42.
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Canada filed an appeal with the WTO Appellate Body.64 Considering the
fact that the case had come under the spotlight of environmental NGOs, and
in anticipation of the likelihood of a number of amicus submissions, the
Appellate Body, pursuant to Article 16(1) of its Working Procudures,
adopted an additional procedure setting out guidelines for applications to
submit an amicus briefs to it.65 Eventually, seventeen NGOs, including
Greenpeace, World Wide Fund for Nature, Ban Asbestos Network,
International Ban Asbestos Secretariat, the Foundation for International
Environmental Law and Development, and the Center for International
Environmental Law, submitted briefs.
This dimarche prompted a huge controversy among WTO Members,
with the United States basically being alone to defend the Appellate Body
actions, and after a special debate, the Chair of the WTO General Council
apparently advised the Appellate Body to proceed with "extreme caution" on
the issue of amicus briefs. 66 Caught between the hammer of environmental
NGOs and the anvil of the DSB, the Appellate Body extricated itself from
the situation not by admitting that it had actually overstepped its powers, but,
more shrewdly, by rejecting all applications to submit amicus briefs on the
basis that they failed to comply sufficiently with all the requirements set
forth in the Additional Procedure.67 There is no need to say that applicants
were not informed as to the ways in which they failed to meet the
requirements.
B. Opening to Private Lawyers in the W4TO
While, in the case of amici curiae, the United States is pushing for
reform and developing countries are resisting it, on the issue of participation
64WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001).
65 WTO, Communications of the Appellate Body, European Communities-
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Additional Procedure
Adopted Under Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review,
WT/DS135/9 (Nov. 8, 2000).
66 Matthew Stillwell, Amicus Brief Storm Highlights WTO's Unease with External
Transparency, BRIDGES, Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 1.
67 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, supra note 65, at para. 56.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
in WTO proceedings of private lawyers, positions are reversed. 68 Developing
countries argue that because of their lack of human resources necessary to
skillfully handle cases, they should be allowed to retain lawyers on the
private market. Conversely, developed countries, and the United States in
particular, fret about issues of confidentiality of proceedings, possible
interference with diplomatic and political decisionmaking by governments,
and the opening of floodgates to private interests, where big multinational
companies might pressure state representatives to include their own lawyers
representing their own interests in the team litigating the case. Yet, on this
sensitive issue, developing countries have a powerful ally: the Washington-
based "international trade bar."
For more than forty-five years, under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) system, private counsels were not permitted to represent
member governments in dispute settlement proceedings. 69 When the WTO
replaced the GATT, at least during the first years, the same practice
prevailed. The absence of private lawyers among the agents and counsels
was considered a testimony to the diplomatic roots of the GATT system: a
dispute settlement mechanism for States and open only to States and their
representatives.
The issue of whether lawyers who are not full-time governmental
officials of the litigating country could be allowed to appear before WTO
dispute settlement organs (while it had already been long practice to consult
with or receive advice from private lawyers outside panel proceedings), was
raised first in 1997 in the so-called Bananas case.70 The United States, as
well as Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico had brought the case
against the EC regime for import, sale, and distribution of bananas. During
the case, Saint Lucia, which is a major banana producer, intervened as third
party. In the proceedings before the panel, the complaining countries
objected to the presence of Mr. Christopher Parlin, a private lawyer of the
Washington D.C. law firm Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, who had
been hired by Saint Lucia to represent it, on the ground that it was long-
standing practice that countries be represented exclusively by government
68 On this issue, see various articles in the Journal of International Economic Law., 2
J. INT'L EcON. L. 155-84 (1999); see also Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, Representation of
Parties in World Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 83 (1997).
69 Gabrielle Marceau, NAFTA and WTO Dispute Settlement Rules: A Thematic
Comparison, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 25, 63 (1997).
70 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
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lawyers or government trade experts. 71 The panel upheld the objection. It
justified its decision by invoking GATT and WTO practice and its own
working procedures, and the fact that that would have been unfair towards
those parties that retained private lawyers to prepare the case, but who did
not appear before the panel. Moreover, and more interestingly, it reached that
conclusion because:
[P]rivate lawyers may not be subject to disciplinary rules such as those
applied to member governments, their presence in panel meetings could
give rise to concerns about breaches of confidentiality; [because] ... it
could ... entail disproportionately large financial burdens for... smaller
members; [and] the presence of private lawyers would change the
intergovernmental character of WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 72
In the same case, the Appellate Body took a different course. 73 In
particular, it did not find anything "in the [WTO Agreement], the DSU or the
Working Procedures, nor in customary international law or the prevailing
practice of international tribunals, which prevents a WTO member from
determining the composition of its delegation in Appellate Body
proceedings." 74 The Appellate Body found that it is for each WTO member
to decide who should represent it as a member of its delegation in an oral
hearing of the Appellate Body.75
71 Id.
72 Id. at para. 7.11.
73 Legally speaking, the Appellate Body did not overturn the decision of the Panel.
Indeed, being a third-party in the Banana case, Saint Lucia could not appeal. However,
the issue of private counsel representation was raised anew by Saint Lucia before the
Appellate Body, when it asked to be represented by a private counsel. Id.
74 Id. at para. 10.
75 See United Nations Draft Articles on the Representation of States in their
Relations with International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.67/4 (1975) (providing
that "the freedom of choice by the sending State of the members of the mission is a
principle basic to the effective performance of the functions of the mission"); see also
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION 70-71 (5th ed. 1996). The Vienna Convention on the Representation of
States in Their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character of
March 13, 1975, does not place any major limitations on States' missions but for the size
of the mission, which should be reasonable and proportionate, and for the case in which
members of the mission are nationals of or permanent residents of the host state. Vienna
Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International
Organizations of a Universal Character, Mar. 14, 1975, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.67/16
(1975).
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Although the Appellate Body's decision was limited to Saint Lucia's
specific request regarding representation in the specific case, and thus does
not have value as legal precedent, the reasoning that supports this decision
applies just as easily to panels as to the Appellate Body's future proceedings.
Since then, appearances of private lawyers have become a regular feature in
WTO litigation. Still, the issue of representation of countries in proceedings
before WTO dispute settlement bodies remains a complex one. Indeed,
developing countries might not necessarily, or not always, desire private
counsel representation. For instance, in the Gasoline case, Latin American
countries declined to bring their private counsel into the room when invited
to do so by the Appellate Body.76
As indicated previously, the opening of the WTO to private lawyers has
been the result of an alliance-of-convenience between developing countries,
which have the majority of seats in the DSB, and the "international trade
bar." Needless to say, many law firms and lawyers saw the opening of the
WTO dispute settlement procedure as a new El Dorado. It should be no
surprise that in 1998 the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association (ABA) accepted a resolution recommended by the ABA Section
on International Law and Practice encouraging the U.S. government to
change its negative stance on the matter.77
American law firms and lawyers are the first, although not the only ones,
to benefit from this. Washington, D.C. has the highest concentration of
attorneys specialized on trade and WTO issues, and certainly more than the
direct competitor, which is Geneva, where the WTO is based. 78 Many former
employees of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative have developed
Washington-based WTO practices. Not surprisingly, it has also probably the
highest concentration of attorneys specialized on anti-dumping. Several of
these D.C. law firms have started opening offices in Geneva to tap into this
new source of business.
76 WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Standard for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 6, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996); see
also Jessica Pearlman, Participation by Private Counsel in WTO Dispute Settlement
Proceedings, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 399, 410 (1999).
77 American Bar Association, House of Delegates, Report of Action Taken at 1998
Midyear Meeting, No. 118a (Feb. 2, 1998), available at http://www.abanet.org/
leadership/98midhod.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2003); see also Pearlman, supra note 76,
at 405.





IV. MEDIA OF AMERICANIZATION
These were just some anecdotes, more or less involving American actors
or practices. Whether these amount to evidence of a creeping
Americanization of international litigation is hard to tell, and perhaps it is not
really the point. As I stated at the beginning of this Article, the transmission
of legal culture is extremely complex and resistant to reduction to a
simplistic producer/receiver process. What is more interesting is rather the
medium through which American legal culture, practice, style, strategy,
views, values, and idiosyncrasies might spread.
Admittedly, it is difficult to pinpoint a few elements peculiar to the
international legal field amongst the multiple expressions of American
hegemony. Again, many traits are not necessarily American as such, but are
rather Anglo-American or features common to most common law countries.
This forewarning is necessary to introduce two possible vehicles of
Americanization: the rise of the American law firm model in public
international litigation, and the related predominance of American and
British law firms in this area; and English as the predominant language of
international litigation.
A. The Rise of the American Law Firm Model 9
International litigation, once the exclusive domain of diplomats,
government officials, and law professors, is increasingly attracting private
practitioners and their law firms. This is the result of the fact that the
proliferation of international judicial bodies, and their increasing use, finally
generates a sufficient workload to justify professional specialization in this
very selective area of litigation. In the realm of law firms with an
international or transnational practice, it is widely acknowledged that in the
past few decades the American model (but not necessarily American law
firms as such) has won the struggle for supremacy.
As in many other fields, the typical American law firm is big, multi-
purpose, commercially oriented, and ruthless in the hunt for cases. This was
the model created by the pioneer Paul Cravath in the late nineteenth century,
which has eventually come to dominate the American legal scene and, from
there, the world. The law firm A-la Cravath is both the emblem and the
engine of the American legal field. 80 Unlike its European counterparts, it
concentrates expertise in many fields, offers advisory services that extend
79 See generally Trubek, supra note 7.
80 Id. at 423.
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well beyond narrow legal advice, litigation, and preparation of documents,
and operates on a regional or national scale. American corporate lawyering
emphasizes strategic planning and advice to clients, and has the capacity to
operate in legal and quasi-legal arenas. In other words, American law firms
provide full services, including the preparation of legislation and
administrative regulations, as well as lobbying and other forms of non-
judicial advocacy.
One of the possible explanations of the eventual rise of the American-
style law firm in the global arena, and one that uses Darwinian arguments, is
that American law firms have been selected by the vicious struggle for
national predominance. 81 Variations in laws from state to state within the
United States have forced large firms to develop the capacity to analyze and
compare different and competing legal orders, and develop strategies through
which their clients can benefit from the legal diversity and complexity
inherent in the federal system of law. These skills make the difference once
U.S. law firms have started exporting their practices abroad.
In contrast, before the rise of the American model and the heightened
political and economic integration of the European continent, the average
European law firm was small or even a solo enterprise. The idea of the
lawyer as a general advisor, or the law firm as a conglomerate of specialties,
was slow to develop. European law firms were not used to lobby and
confabulate with political power. The European model did not place much
stress on pro bono activities or public interest law either.
There is also another difference in the legal culture that matters, which is
the transformation of the identity and status of the typical lawyer appearing
before a court of law.82 Americans tend to give greater status to practitioners
over higher academics. In the United States, besides a few judges of the
highest courts, the corporate lawyer is at the peak of the legal profession.
Conversely, in the case of Europeans it used to be the reverse. Historically,
the legal systems of continental Europe rested their legitimacy on the
authority of legal science. Legal authority was derived from codes which
were scientifically constructed, and embodied in authoritative doctrine
maintained by those at the top of the academic pyramid. The division of
labor and status between those who practiced the law and those who made
and interpreted it was clearly defined. Practitioners who had regular contact
with the realities of everyday legal life were seen as inferior to leading
academics. 83
81 Id. at 423-24.
8 2 Id. at 421-23.
83 Id. at 421-22.
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The Americanization of international litigation follows a couple of
decades after the revolution brought by American law firms in Europe and
the Americanization of European law firms. Nowadays, the field is
dominated by a handful of large American 84 and British law firms, 85
whatever national labels in such an intricate and transnational world might
mean. A few small law firms, like the London-based Matrix Chambers, or
the Geneva-based Lalive and Partners, or Van den Biesen, Prakken, Bohler
in Amsterdam, or Wladimiroff, Waling, Schreuders in The Hague, have
found small niches on their own. The great majority, if not the totality, of
private lawyers appearing in international judicial fora are either attorneys of
these law firms, or, as traditionally, are professors of international law. Yet,
the important difference, as contrasted to the past, is that more and more
often academics do not appear in their own personal capacity, but as counsels
or partners of these private law firms where they practice besides their
ordinary teaching duties (something which has always been done by most
law professors, but that hitherto had not been done by professors of public
international law). Undoubtedly, the stateless community of public
international lawyers is cosmopolitan and that perfectly suits Americanism.
B. Language
A second medium injecting American legal culture in international
litigation is the predominance of English as working language of
international courts and tribunals. This issue might seem trivial, or self-
explanatory, which accounts for its usual oversight, but it is not so to those
like myself who have not been reared reading Shakespeare or Moliere.
There is no need to dwell upon the rise of English to modem lingua
franca (after Greek, Latin, and French, in this order, have carried out that
function) and the role this has played in fostering the commercial and
cultural Anglo-American hegemony. In the field of international litigation, it
suffices to say that it plays a role as well and very likely a decisive one.
Indeed, to effectively plead before an international bench one has to be not
only fluent at least in one of the official working languages, but command
must be of such a level as to be able to rival that of colleagues who have been
born speaking that language and have spent their whole life practicing law in
it. As Shabtai Rosenne and Keith Highet-two old hands of the ICJ and
84 E.g., Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; Debevoise & Plimpton; LeBoeuf,
Lamb, Greene & MacRae; White & Case; Baker & McKenzie.
85 E.g., Eversheds; Freshfields, Bruckhaus, Deringer; Kendall Freeman; Herbert
Smith; Clifford Chance.
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amongst the selected few that can claim to be part of the ICJ "invisible
bar,"86-wrote, the importance of oral proceedings before the ICJ cannot be
overestimated, as effective oral pleading can make the difference between
defeat or victory. 87
English is the official working language of the ICJ (together with
French)88 and the ITLOS (again, together with French). 89 At the WTO,
English, French, and Spanish are official languages, and in theory the parties
may use any of the three during proceedings, but, in reality, most
proceedings are conducted in English only.90 It should be no surprise that the
overwhelming majority of lawyers appearing before these bodies are of
either English or French (less so) mother tongue.
An extrapolation of some data contained in a very interesting and recent
article revealingly entitled "How International is International Law?" will
illustrate the point. Kurt Gaubatz and Matthew MacArthur carefully
tabulated fifty years of practice (1948-1998) before the ICJ.91 In particular,
they examined every contentious case that included oral proceedings
regarding preliminary objections, interim measures, permission to intervene,
or merits, and compiled data on the lawyers who participated in each sitting
of the oral proceedings of those cases. The data they collected includes
information on 47 cases, involving 50 countries and 593 legal teams, argued
over the course of approximately 1,000 public sittings. 92 Excluding national
86 As of 2000, only fourteen lawyers had pleaded in three cases or more. Of these,
six were British, four French, and the other four were respectively an American, an
Australian, a Belgian and a Uruguayan. Alain Pellet, The Role of the International
Lawyer in International Litigation, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER AS PRACTITIONER
147, 148-49 (Chanke Wickremasinghe ed., 2000).
87 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 129
(5th ed.1995); Keith Highet, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 400, 402 (1992)
(reviewing TERRY D. GILL, LITIGATION STRATEGY AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A
CASE STUDY OF THE NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES DISPUTE (1989)).
88 I.C.J. Statute, art. 39.1, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasic
documents/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
89 International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea Rules, art. 43, available at
http://www.itlos.orgldocuments-publications/documents/rulesen.doc (last visited Sept.
25, 2003).
90 PHILLIPPE SANDS ET AL., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
78 (1999).
91 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz & Matthew MacArthur, How International is 'International'
Law?, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 239 (2001).
92 Id. at 250-51.
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lawyers, 93 when non-national lawyers are hired, 80% of the time94 they come
from just four countries, two (one at least partly) Francophone and two
Anglophone. 95 Other countries, which are neither Francophone nor
Anglophone, and have provided lawyers pleading orally before the court are
Italy, Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Japan, Denmark, Uruguay,
Czechoslovakia, India, and Israel (this excludes Switzerland, Canada,
Australia, Liberia, and Madagascar where French is also an official
language). All these countries together have provided only forty lawyers,
pleading fifty-two times over fifty years of the life of the ICJ. 9 6 This does not
take into account two further facts. First, those lawyers who do plead in
English or French without it being their mother tongue are very likely to have
actually had French or English as their mother tongue nonetheless. Second,
to be able to plead effectively in English or French without it being one's
mother tongue requires long years of specific study. That means that those
who do plead in English or French without being mother tongue, are very
likely to have spent a long time studying in the United States, the United
Kingdom, or France, thus becoming spontaneous vehicles of the legal culture
of those countries.
Similar detailed and comprehensive data for the ITLOS and WTO is not
available, but figures are not likely to be much different from those of the
ICJ. Actually, representation by non-nationals is likely to be even more tilted
in favor of Anglophones and Francophones in those two fora. Indeed, even a
cursory look at the eight cases where oral pleadings have been made to date
before the 1TLOS, 97 it is evident that French, British, Australian, New
Zealand, and American lawyers have pleaded the most as non-nationals. In
the case of the WTO, as it was previously noted, most of private lawyers
representing countries in WTO proceedings come from Washington D.C. law
firms.
Finally, make no mistake about it, while from this picture it seems that,
after all, by the strenuous defense of their language, at least before the ICJ,
93 That is, lawyers which have the same nationality of the party they represent.
94 Calculated over the total number of appearances (265) by lawyers in oral
proceedings.
95 France (with 35 lawyers, appearing 78 times), United Kingdom (35 lawyers and
74 times), the United States (27 lawyers, 48 times), and Belgium (9 lawyers for 22
appearances).
96 Id. at 258-59, tbl. 5.
97 In the "Chaisiri Reefer 2" Case (Pan. v. Yemen), Prompt Release, and the Case
concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the
South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/Eur. Community), no oral pleadings have been made.
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the French are holding out as the last bastion of civil law in a sea of common
lawyers, in reality the battle has been lost when increasingly the younger
generations select English speaking countries to pursue legal studies abroad.
The future speaks English, Ca va sans dire, and common law and American
culture will increasingly inform international litigation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The World Values Survey, a research project of the University of
Michigan's Institute for Social Research about the attitudes, values, and
beliefs of a large number of societies all over the world over the past twenty
years, seems to indicate that while expectedly economic development brings
along pervasive cultural changes, it still does not produce a uniform global
culture.98 According to the survey, industrializing societies do not seem to
show signs of becoming like the United States In other words, it seems that
the world talks the American talk when convenient, but, in the end, it does
not adopt American values.99
Writing about the "Americanization" of international commercial
arbitration, Reed and Sutcliffe concluded that "American practices are now
integrated into the historically Western European playing field of
international commercial arbitration [and that] ... those practices are not out
of balance with civil law practices." In sum, "it is more accurate, at the
opening of the 21st century, to describe international arbitration as
increasingly 'homogenized' rather than 'Americanized."' 100
Not being American myself, I tend to come to less conciliatory
conclusions, but I am still a far cry from the opposite extreme of "Legal
Imperialism." 101 Undoubtedly, contemporary public international law shows
signs of the contamination by American legal consciousness in its doctrinal
structures, institutions, and discourse. Due to the economic, political, and
military dominance it enjoys (although it is far more limited than most
people assume), it is inevitable that the United States should have also started
making its weight felt in the legal field. Had it not, it would have been a very
98 University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, World Values Survey, at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/library/index.html (last visited on Sept. 25, 2003).
99 Ronald Inglehart & Wayne Baker, Modernization's Challenge to Traditional
Values: Who's Afraid of Ronald McDonald?, THE FUTURIST, Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 16.
100 Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 12, at 37.
101 The expression is borrowed from the seminal book by James Gardner. See James
Gardner, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN
AMERICA (1981); see also generally Mattei, supra note 6.
[Vol. 19:1 20031
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
strange anomaly, indeed. I suspect that the U.S. influence is more felt in the
domestic legal sphere and in international trade law than in public
international law, but this is only a conjecture.
This Article has presented a few recent anecdotes to illustrate instances
of possible Americanization of international litigation. In the WTO, U.S.
influence may explain why adjudication appears to be the dominate means of
settling trade disputes, which is ultimately developed at the expense of
negotiation. Surely the United States (meaning both the U.S. government or
interest of private American actors) is the force behind the drive to opening
the WTO dispute settlement procedure to amici curiae and private lawyers.
The ICJ is as busy as ever, and procedural wrangling and over-litigation are
becoming significant. Whether this can be attributed to American influence is
questionable. But surely, it is a world where American and British law firms
dominate the scene, and where English is increasingly the only language
spoken. Obviously, language is only the external appearance of thought.
In other words, evidence available is simply not enough to level charges
of Americanization. However, to be able to reach sound conclusions on
whether the American legal culture has an impact on international litigation,
there is the need for a comprehensive, systematic and cross-disciplined study,
which enlists, besides scholars of public international law, comparative
lawyers and legal sociologists. Clearly, this endeavor is beyond the scope of
these few observations. Whether more U.S. influence in the field of
international litigation is, in the end, a positive or negative development, is
open to dispute.
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